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Abstract
One reason that cigarette consumption is highly regulated is because of the paternalistic view that
smokers would not make rational choices even if fully informed about the risks. A deficiency of this view is
that in the presence of preference heterogeneity regulating smoking may lead to smokers finding ways to
circumvent the regulations. Though there is widespread recognition that preference heterogeneity may exist
there is very little documentation of it. In this study, we provide empirical evidence on the relationship
between smoking status, and time and risk preference, valuation of health, and subjective beliefs about
future macroeconomic events, using panel data from the Health and Retirement Study. We find that
smokers are more impatient than nonsmokers and are more pessimistic about future macroeconomic events,
which may reinforce their present orientation. Smokers are also more risk tolerant. This suggests that
smokers may more willingly bear risk, and trade off current utility against future costs of smoking.
However, they do not value being in excellent health differently from others. Our results also suggest that
being more present-oriented and risk tolerant is not caused by smoking, but represents innate
characteristics. An implication of our results for product regulation is that restricting access to cigarettes
is likely to be circumvented by smokers through other means. In particular, our results are consistent with
the finding that smokers in states with higher taxes smoke longer cigarettes that are also higher in nicotine
and tar content.
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Cigarette consumption is highly regulated (Viscusi, 2002). There are two possible reasons for
such regulation. First, smokers may be inadequately informed about the risks of smoking, and
the goal of regulation is to inform these individuals about such risks; once informed, they will
make rational choices in their own self interest.
1 Alternatively, there is a paternalistic rationale.
2
Smokers would not make rational choices even if fully informed of the risk, and it is the job of
product regulation to prevent people from making choices that the rest of the public would not
make. A deficiency of the paternalistic view is that to the extent that smokers have different
preferences, they will simply find ways to circumvent the regulations.
Three examples are illustrative. First, the experience during Prohibition in the U.S. was that
regulations were circumvented by illegal activity. Second, in seminal work on safety regulation,
Peltzman (1975), and later Blomquist (1991), found that seatbelt regulation did not reduce motor
vehicle fatalities, suggesting that automobile drivers traded the risk reduction from seatbelts
usage for more hazardous driving. Third, in subsequent work, Peltzman (1987) also found no
empirical support for the view that mandatory prescription legislation lowered accidental
poisonings or adverse drug reactions.
3
Such evidence suggests that individuals plausibly differ in their willingness to accept risk in
return for some other benefit. Thus, there is a relationship between the level of safety of a
product and individual behaviors, and greater safety regulation may be offset by a decrease in
caution on the part of individuals. This implies that even paternalistic regulators need to account
for individuals’ risk preferences in setting safety standards and designing regulations.
Furthermore, there is a long history of interest among economists in decisions made by
individuals under conditions of risk and uncertainty (e.g., Knight, 1921). However, there is very
little evidence about the economic primitives of preferences and beliefs in such contexts.
Smoking is a perfect example of a real world risky decision under uncertainty with important
implications for individual wellbeing. The risk arises from the effect of smoking on current and
future health, which entails an uncertainty in that the risk may differ substantially among
individuals at the time the smoking decision is made.
4
In this study, we provide empirical evidence on the relationship between smoking status and
following preference parameters and subjective beliefs using the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS). Although economists accept the notion that there is heterogeneity in preferences and
subjective beliefs, which has important implications for product regulation, empirical evidence
on such heterogeneity is very limited.
5 Thus, our study is important in documenting such
1 We examine this issue in a companion paper, Khwaja et al. (2005).
2 In fact Gruenspecht and Lave (1989, p. 1532) write that, bPaternalism is also clear in decisions that something beyond
providing information to workers about risk is required to optimize occupational safety...Indeed, few people other than
economists and libertarians seems to regard it as even questionable that governments would not act to regulate large risks
rather than provide workers with information.Q
3 Not all safety regulations have been found to be ineffective, see, e.g., Magat and Moore (1996), who present evidence
on effective regulations in the case of bicycles.
4 Important contributions to the economic literature on smoking have recognized the significance of dynamics and
uncertainty in the decision to smoke (e.g., Becker and Murphy, 1988; Becker et al., 1994; Orphanides and Zervos, 1995;
Gruber and Ko ¨szegi, 2001). Chaloupka and Warner (2000) provide a comprehensive review of the theoretical and
empirical literature on smoking.
5 One exception is the literature on value of life derived from observed tradeoffs between wages and job risk, e.g.,
Thaler and Rosen (1976) and Viscusi (1979).
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different value on being in good health, then regulation would need to accommodate these
differences. To the extent that there is regulation, and consumer preferences are to be honored,
such regulation should be based on the external costs of smoking rather than the internal costs to
smokers themselves. Under paternalism, our analysis is important in that it helps to explain
untended consequences of regulation that are likely to occur when constraints are imposed, e.g.,
other risk taking behaviors in lieu of smoking. In fact, Evans and Farrelly (1998) find that
smokers adjust their smoking behavior in states with higher taxes. Smokers in such states are
more likely to smoke longer cigarettes that are also higher in nicotine and tar content.
In particular we examine (1) Time preference: If smokers are more impatient, then they would
prefer the current utility from smoking over the future health costs of this habit. Hence, variation
in discount factors by smoking status, as has been found for economic decisions in other
contexts (Harrison et al., 2002; Kapteyn and Teppa, 2003; Bickel and Johnson, 2003), is a
potentially important determinant to consider in making smoking regulations. (2) Expectations
about future macroeconomic outcomes: Smokers may differ systematically from nonsmokers in
beliefs about future economic events, such as inflation and business cycles. If smokers are
systematically pessimistic about future states of the world, they might affect their present and
future consumption patterns. (3) Risk preference: Smokers may be more risk tolerant, holding
other factors constant (Barsky et al., 1997). Thus, they may be more willing to trade off the
benefits of smoking for the elevated health risk. (4) Health valuation: Smokers may place a
lower value on good health (Viscusi and Herch, 2001). If so, this would explain their decisions
to smoke.
We use panel data from the first six waves (1992–2002) of the HRS. Our samples include
persons irrespective of their smoking status. There are two important advantages of using HRS.
First, the HRS is unique in containing detailed information about health behaviors, time
preferences, risk tolerance, health valuation, and subjective beliefs about the future. Second, we
are able to use the longitudinal nature of data to observe whether preferences and beliefs change
with changes in smoking status over time.
We find that smokers are more present-oriented and have a higher risk tolerance than others.
Consistent with the former, we find that smokers are pessimistic about future economic events,
such as business cycle downturns, high inflation, and loss of Social Security benefits. Smokers
do not differ from others in terms of valuing health. In sum, our findings suggest that smokers
are distinguished by being myopic and having greater risk tolerance. An implication of our
results for product regulation is that restricting access to cigarettes is likely to be circumvented
by smokers through other means. In particular, our results are consistent with the finding that
smokers in states with higher taxes smoke longer cigarettes that are also higher in nicotine and
tar content (Evans and Farrelly, 1998).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes data and empirical specification.
Results and discussion follow in Section 3.I nSection 4, we discuss implications of this study
and conclude.
2. Data and empirical specification
2.1. Data
Our data come from the first six waves (1992–2002) of the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS). The HRS is a national panel study of birth cohorts 1931–1941 and their spouses, if
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years since 1992. Individuals in the first wave of the HRS range from 51 to 61 years of age;
spouses received an identical interview and could be of any age. In 1998, three new cohorts born
before 1924 (AHEAD), between 1924 and 1930 (CODA) and between 1942 and 1947 (WB)
were added to the sample. We also use experimental modules, administered to sub-samples of
respondents, from some of the HRS waves in this study. The modules vary by survey year. Also,
some of the questions were in some waves only administered to part of the sample. The total
number of observations (person years) from the HRS through wave 6 included in any part of our
analysis was 54,082; the number of observations in any particular analysis ranged from 236
(willingness to pay for perfect health) to 21,804 (expectations about future inflation). For
additional detail, see Juster and Suzman (1995).
2.2. Empirical specification
In the empirical analysis of the relationship between smoking status, and heterogeneity in
preferences and subjective beliefs, we follow Barsky et al. (1997) and specify that for each
individual i at time t, the dependent variable (Yit) is a function of the explanatory variables (Xit)
and binary indicators of smoking status, i.e., current smoking (cit=1 if current smoker and 0
otherwise) and former smoker (fit=1 if current smoker and 0 otherwise), with the never smokers
being the base category,
Yit ¼ acit þ bfit þ XitVp þ lt þ eit: ð1Þ
The error term (eit) is assumed to be orthogonal to all the regressors and lt captures time
fixed effects. Eq. (1) is estimated using OLS when the dependent variable is continuous. In
instances when the dependent variable is discrete, we use either a probit or an ordered probit
regression to estimate Eq. (1).
To examine the effects of unobserved heterogeneity in explaining the differences in the
preferences and subjective beliefs, we also use a second specification,
Yit ¼ acit þ bfit þ XitVp þ lt þ gt þ eit: ð2Þ
In this case, gi is an individual specific fixed effect for individual i, and eit is orthogonal to
the regressors. We also allow for cov(Xit,gi)p0, cov(cit,gi)p0 and cov(fit,gi)p0. We estimate
Eq. (2) by taking first differences (FD) to eliminate the individual specific fixed effect (gi)t o
obtain
Yit   Yit 1 ðÞ ¼ a cit   cit 1 ðÞ þ b fit   fit 1 ðÞ þ XitV   Xit 1 V ðÞ p þ lt   lit 1 ðÞ
þ eit   eit 1 ðÞ ; ð3Þ
which is then used to recover the parameters of interest using OLS with Huber–White robust
standard errors. This specification is used for a discrete dependent variable in only one case and
that is discussed in more detail below.
2.3. Dependent variables
We now describe the dependent variables (Yit) in greater detail. The precise questions for
these dependent variables are presented in Appendix A.
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The HRS asked respondents in the main survey about their financial planning horizons, with
possible responses being the next few months, the next year, the next few years, the next 5–10
years, and more than 10 years.
6 We use this as our measure of time preference.
We use these five categories to define an ordered dependent variable with longer time
horizons being a higher order. In wave 1, all self-responding persons were asked this question. In
waves 2 and 3, these questions were not asked. In wave 4, persons born before 1931 were not
asked these questions, but those born in 1931 or subsequently or spouses were asked these
questions. One of 10 HRS cohort respondents was randomly selected for this question. In waves
5, one of 12 respondents was randomly selected for this question. All entry cohort subsamples
were eligible for selection. In wave 6, if person was 65 or older, the questions were skipped.
There are 21,200 usable observations on financial planning horizon. The mean time-horizon
category was 3.09 (Table 1). To examine consistency of responses to the time preference
question across waves, we present within-individual correlations among stated time horizons
among the waves of HRS in which the question was asked (Table 2, Panel A). Almost all of the
correlations are statistically significant at the 1% level; they range from 0.1 to 0.3. There is
6 Henceforth, we only indicate when questions are part of modules. The default category is the main survey.
Table 1
Summary statistics
Variables Observations Mean Standard deviation
Dependent variables
Financial planning horizon (five categories) 21,200 3.09 1.23
Subjective probability of economic depression 13,659 0.45 0.29
Subjective probability of double-digit inflation 21,804 0.51 0.28
Subjective probability of Social Security cuts 11,262 0.60 0.31
Subjective probability of bioterrorism 3768 0.62 0.28
Relative risk tolerance 20,975 0.24 0.14
Trade any dollars for perfect health
a 420 0.64 0.48
Willingness to pay for perfect health ($/month)
b 236 625.96 1525.52
Willingness to pay for Alzheimer drug ($/month)
b 316 176.42 235.20
Willingness to pay for cancer drug ($/month)
b 271 238.95 294.63
Explanatory variables
Current smoker (0–1) 54,082 0.23 0.42
Former smoker (0–1) 54,082 0.38 0.482
Subjective probability of living to 75 54,082 0.65 0.29
Age 54,082 57.02 5.39
White 54,082 0.82 0.38
Female 54,082 0.59 0.49
Years of education 54,082 12.04 3.09
Subjective probability of Alzheimer’s disease 316 0.30 0.27
Subjective probability of cancer 271 0.38 0.28
Stressful job (0–1) 54,082 0.19 0.32
Divorced within last 2 years (0–1) 53,981 0.07 0.25
Widowed within last 2 years (0–1) 53,981 0.01 0.11
Death of parent within last 2 years (0–1) 44,012 0.01 0.10
a The five categories are: next few months, next year, next few years, next 5–10 years, more than 10 years.
b Based on nonzero values.
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over the years.
An experimental module in wave 1 attempted to recover the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution. Although this measure reflects the underlying theoretical concept better than the
bfinancial planning horizon,Q we recover elasticities of substitution that were nearly zero for both
smokers and nonsmokers (as in Barsky et al., 1997, see footnote 31, p. 567). Thus, we do not
rely on these results.
7
Table 2
Correlations of responses between waves
A. Financial planning horizon
Wave 1 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6
Wave 1
Wave 4 0.10* (0.01)
Wave 5 0.16** (0.00) 0.21** (0.00)
Wave 6 0.12** (0.00) 0.19** (0.00) 0.30** (0.00)
B. Subjective probability of economic depression
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3
Wave 1
Wave 2 0.31** (0.13)
Wave 3 0.29** (0.00) 0.42** (0.00)
C. Subjective probability of double-digit inflation
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5
Wave 1
Wave 2 0.24** (0.00)
Wave 3 0.23** (0.00) 0.36** (0.00)
Wave 4 0.21** (0.00) 0.31** (0.00) 0.33** (0.00)
Wave 5 0.22** (0.00) 0.30** (0.00) 0.35** (0.00) 0.36** (0.00)
D. Subjective probability of social security cuts
Wave 1 Wave 3
Wave 1
Wave 3 0.19** (0.00)
E. Relative risk tolerance
Wave 1 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6
Wave 1
Wave 4 0.07 (0.07)
Wave 5 0.15** (0.00) 0.25** (0.00)
Wave 6 0.11** (0.00) 0.20** (0.00) 0.24** (0.00)
p-values in brackets.
* Significant at 5%.
7 See Kapteyn and Teppa (2003) for an extension of Barsky et al. (1997). Their study did not evaluate the link between
smoking and time preference.
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The HRS asked about subjective probabilities of a depression in the U.S. economy in the next
10 years (all six waves), of double-digit inflation in the next 10 years (first five waves),
reductions in Social Security benefits in the next 10 years (all waves but the second),
8 and an
incident of bioterrorism affecting 100 persons or more in the next 5 years (wave 6). Mean
probabilities with sample sizes in parentheses are 0.45 for depression (N=13,659), 0.51 for
double-digit inflation (N=21,804), 0.60 for a cut in Social Security benefits (N=11,262), and
0.62 for an incident of bioterrorism (N=3768). In waves 4–6, expectations about economic
depression, social security, and bioterrorism were only asked to first-time respondents.
We also computed correlations for responses to the expectation questions across waves. For
economic depression, the correlations ranged from 0.29 to 0.42, all statistically significant at the
1% level (Table 2, Panel B). For double-digit inflation, correlations ranged from 0.21 and 0.36,
again all significant at the 1% level (Panel C). For the subjective probability of Social Security
cuts, only asked to an overlapping set of correspondents in waves 1 and 3, the correlation is 0.19,
significant at the 1% level. These correlations are generally in the same range as the correlations
for time and risk preference, with a similar interpretation about variation over time.
2.3.3. Risk preferences
In waves 1, 4, 5 and 6, HRS asked questions to measure the respondent’s risk preference. The
questions on risk preferences were asked to the same sample as the previously discussed question
on financial planning horizon. Relative risk tolerance is calculated using responses to a gamble
based on lifetime earnings.
9 The measure ranges from 0.15 and 0.57; a higher value represents
higher relative risk tolerance. The question was changed in wave 4 to eliminate the status quo
bias. We pooled observations from all the waves, but include wave fixed effects to account for
this change and other time-specific effects. Except for the correlation between waves 1 and 4, the
correlations across waves are all statistically significant at the 1% level and range between 0.11
and 0.25 (Table 2, Panel B). The lower correlation between the answers in waves 1 and 4 could
be due to the change in the question. We interpret these results in the same way as for time
preference.
2.3.4. Health valuation
Wave 5 of HRS includes standard gamble questions in an experimental module. Respondents
were asked to assume that they would live for 10 years in the current state of health with same
medical expenses and insurance premiums as at the interview date. The individual was asked
whether s/he would be willing to pay any amount for additional treatment to be in perfect health.
There are 876 respondents of whom 420 were willing to pay something for perfect health.
10 The
420 persons were asked for the maximum amount they would be willing to pay each month for
this additional treatment.
Wave 6 includes questions in the experimental module on willingness to pay for drugs to cure
(1) Alzheimer’s disease and (2) cancer. Respondents provided their subjective probabilities of
8 However, only in waves one and three were the same individuals asked the question.
9 The questions separate the respondents into four distinct risk preference categories, ranked from I to IV. For a
discussion of the method for calculating relative risk tolerance of each group and other measures used in the analysis
described below, see Barsky et al. (1997).
10 In the standard gamble analysis, we drop six observations; four show inconsistent answers and two answers are
outliers ($1,000,000).
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drug that would cure each of these diseases.
2.4. Explanatory variables
For the continuous dependent variables, we use ordinary least squares. For the discrete
dependent variables, we use ordered probit and ordinary least squares using the
specifications described in Eqs. (1) and (3). We control for smoking status at the time of
the interview: current smoker (23% of sample); and former smoker (38% of sample). Never
smoker is the omitted reference group. Explanatory variables, Xit, (with means in the
parentheses) are age (57.0), and indicators for race and gender, i.e., white (82%), and female
(59%). In the analysis of willingness to pay for drugs that cure Alzheimer’s disease and cancer,
we included subjective probabilities for getting Alzheimer’s (0.30) and for cancer (0.38).
Nineteen percent of persons reported that they worked at stressful jobs. Seven percent were
divorced within the last 2 years, 1% were widowed, and 1% had a parent die within the last 2
years. The mean subjective probability of living to age 75 was 0.65. Mean years of education
completed was 12.04 years.
Two other variables were included in preliminary analysis, but excluded from the analysis
presented below because of their potential endogeneity: self-reported health status and
household income. Since for the HRS sample, which has a mean age of 64.7, educational
attainment could be considered plausibly exogenous, we also estimated a specification in which
in addition to the explanatory variables we also included educational attainment. This did not
change our results so these estimates are not reported. For each of the dependent variables for
which we have a panel we include time fixed effects in the regressions as well as control for
individual specific unobserved heterogeneity using first difference estimation.
3. Empirical results and discussion
3.1. Time preference
Holding other factors constant, current smokers are more impatient based on the financial
planning horizon in both OLS (Table 3, col. 1) and ordered probit regressions (col. 2). The
time horizon for former smokers does not differ from that for never smokers. Individuals
with a higher subjective probability of living to 75 have a longer financial planning
horizon.
When controlling for individual fixed effects,
11 financial planning horizons of current
smokers do not differ from others, implying that the difference between current smokers and
others in the financial planning horizon is time-invariant heterogeneity and not dependent on
quitting. With individual fixed effects, the former smoker variable does not appear since no one
went from being a non-smoker to a current smoker within a 2-year time interval. Though our
results provide evidence that there is a correlation between smoking status and financial planning
11 It is well documented that the specification in Eq. (3) may not work well when the dependent variable is discrete,
which for us is the case with financial planning horizon. However, we find that in this case the OLS and ordered probit
regressions for the specification in equation 1 produce nearly identical results (Table 3, cols. 1 and 3). Hence, we use the
specification in Eq. (3) to examine the effects of unobserved heterogeneity in the relationship between smoking status and
financial planning horizon using OLS, with the appropriate caveats.
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to establish causality. However, that is not the primary focus of this paper.
12
Several approaches exist for assessing time preference, including estimating discount rates
(e.g., Harrison et al., 2002), intertemporal elasticity of substitution, e.g., Kapteyn and Teppa
(2003), and time horizons for decision-making, which is the approach we use. Using wave 1
of HRS, we tried estimating the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, but as in Barsky et
al. (1997), we found the estimate for the whole sample was close to zero. Likely
explanations include inadequacy of the question as well as the small sample (N=198).
13 We
do find that smokers differ from never smokers with respect to two measures of planning
horizons for decision-making, implying that smokers are more present-oriented.
We do not examine time preferences in the health domain which is both an advantage and
a disadvantage. Using a financial measure is more general as it pertains to non-health
decisions, which would be affected by the decision to smoke. A discount factor for health
may be more likely to be endogenous to the decision to smoke. This may be one reason that
the financial planning horizon is time invariant to the decision to smoke, which gives us
greater confidence in the OLS results. Moreover, in economics, there is no theoretical
rationale for different discount factors across domains though the psychological literature has
made such a distinction, even in the context of smoking (Bickel and Johnson, 2003;
Chapman, 2003). It would be of empirical interest to determine whether smokers are more
impatient in the health domain as well as to recover direct measures of impatience, i.e.,
13 Of these, 12% of responses yielded no information about elasticities of intertemporal substitution because respondents
choose either the steepest falling or steepest rising consumption path for all interest rates. Another 29% chose
combinations of consumption paths exhibiting behavior that is inconsistent with rational intertemporal choice; for
example, they choose a lower future consumption if the real interest rates increases. The most common answers from the
remaining 116 valid responses was to choose a flat consumption path for all three interest rates or a slightly upward
moving consumption rate for all interest rates (together 72% of responses).
12 In work not reported we examine the causal relationship between smoking status and the various dependent variables
in this study. We used cross-state and inter-temporal differences in cigarette prices and in regulations that may impact




(1) OLS (2) Ordered probit (3) First differences
Current smoker  0.088* (0.023)  0.068* (0.021)  0.124 (0.086)
Former smoker 0.002 (0.02) 0.001 (0.018)
Subjective probability live to 75 0.003* (0.0003) 0.003* (0.0002) 0.021 (0.058)
Age  0.01* (0.001)  0.009* (0.002)
White 0.297* (0.024) 0.245* (0.021)
Female  0.134* (0.018)  0.117* (0.016)
Years of education 0.055* (0.003) 0.047* (0.003)
Observations 21,200 21,200 6365
R-squared 0.059 0.019 0.001
aSignificant at 10%;
bSignificant at 5%.
Huber–White standard errors in brackets.
Coefficients for wave fixed effects are not shown.
* Significant at 1%.
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undertaking such an examination.
3.2. Expectations of future economic events
Holding other factors constant, smokers are 4.17 percentage points higher than never smokers
in expecting an economic depression in the U.S. in the OLS specification (Table 4, col. 1). There
are no differences in expectations between former and never smokers. In the regression for
economic depression, controlling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, the effect of being
a current smoker on expectations is about as large and statistically significant at the five percent
level (col. 2). Thus, beliefs about the state of the future economy do vary with changes in smoking
status. In the OLS regression, the subjective probability of living to 75 is negatively related to the
subjective probability of an economic depression probably reflecting pessimism. However, the
coefficientonthisvariablechangessignoncetime-invariantindividualpersonalcharacteristicsare
accounted for in the first differences regression. Then individuals who have a higher subjective
expected longevity also attach a higher probability to experience an economic depression.
Expectations of double-digit inflation are 4.65 percentage points higher for current than for
never smokers (col. 3). The coefficient for former smokers is not statistically significant.
Accounting for individual heterogeneity, current smokers have a statistically significant higher
expectation of double-digit inflation (col. 4), but the effect is smaller that in the OLS
specification. For double-digit inflation, there is no difference in subjective beliefs depending on
the individual’s subjective probability of survival. However, as with the probability of economic
depression, with first differences, there is a strong positive effect of subjective probability of
living to 75 on the subjective probability of expected double-digit inflation.
Expectations of cuts in Social Security benefits are 3.24 percentage points higher for current
relative to never smokers, and but there is not statistically significant difference from those of
former smokers (col. 5). In the corresponding fixed effects analysis (col. 6), there is no difference
based on smoking status. The results of the subjective probability of living to 75 are similar to
the double-digit inflation case, except that the result in the first difference analysis is not
statistically significant at conventional levels. Finally, in the analysis of expectations of
bioterrorism, both current (4.44) and former smokers (2.00) are pessimistic relative to never
smokers (col. 7). This analysis also accounted for other potential determinants of expectations
about future events including measures of stress, such as job related stress.
Previous studies have examined whether smokers differ from nonsmokers in how they assess
the probabilities of future health events such as the subjective probability of surviving beyond a
certain age (Smith et al., 2001), or the objective risk of getting lung cancer (Viscusi, 1990).
Subjective probabilities of survival and other events may be endogenous to the smoking
decision. This is not likely for the types of macroeconomic events evaluated in this study. In
general, we find that smokers are more pessimistic about future economic events, implying a
lower future expected utility. This could explain the decision to smoke, which reduces the
person’s longevity, and is consistent with a person’s preference for current over future
consumption.
3.3. Risk preference
Compared to never smokers, current and former smokers are more risk tolerant (OLS
specification, Table 5, col. 1). In the specification including fixed effects (col. 2), the current
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Expectations about future events
Subjective probability of
economic depression
Subjective probability of double-digit
inflation




(1) OLS (2) First
differences
(3) OLS (4) First
differences
(5) OLS (6) First differences (7) OLS
Current smoker 4.172* (0.685) 3.801** (1.804) 4.647* (0.601) 2.759** (1.368) 3.235* (0.744)  1.003 (2.723) 4.442* (1.321)




 0.035* (0.010) 1.975*** (1.149)  0.003 (0.008) 4.616* (0.897) 0.003 (0.011) 2.265 (1.621)  0.017 (0.019)
Age  0.035 (0.053)  0.103** (0.044)  0.364* (0.057) 0.071 (0.093)
White  4.85* (0.732)  1.62* (0.625) 5.27* (0.791) 5.784* (1.330)
Female 3.69* (0.644) 3.504* (0.514)  1.788* (0.671) 0.063 (0.987)
Years of
education
 0.612* (0.106)  0.423* (0.090) 1.125* (0.110) 0.33*** (0.185)
Stressful job  1.406* (0.301)  0.432 (0.420)  1.281* (0.250)  0.177 (0.278)  1.516* (0.345)  0.259 (0.686)  2.102* (0.584)
Divorced 0.749 (1.915) 3.703 (3.523)  0.639 (1.563)  1.069 (2.625) 0.09 (2.097) 7.641*** (4.441) 3.486 (3.630)
Widowed 0.558 (1.914) 0.627 (3.232) 0.907 (1.547)  0.061 (2.119) 0.716 (2.483) 0.63 (5.098)  5.693*** (3.292)
Death of parent 0.921 (0.842)  0.129 (1.512)  0.0002 (0.683) 0.5 (1.103) 0.396 (1.092)  3.303 (2.478)  1.283 (1.566)
Observations 13,659 6931 21,804 14,317 11,262 4539 3768
R-squared 0.1 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.002 0.02
Huber–White standard errors in brackets.
Coefficients for wave fixed effects are not shown.
* Significant at 1%.
** Significant at 5%.
















































7smoker variable no longer has an effect on risk tolerance. This implies that the effect of smoking
status in the OLS regression represents a time-invariant individual effect.
Barsky et al. (1997) used the answers to a lifetime income gamble question in the first two
waves of the HRS to construct measures of risk tolerance. They found a positive correlation
between risk tolerance and smoking status. We include three additional waves in our study
and find a similar relationship between smoking and risk tolerance. In addition, exploiting
the panel, we find that there is no significant change in risk tolerance for individuals who
change their smoking status. This result implies that risk tolerance is a time-invariant
characteristic.
3.4. Health valuation
We check for differences in health valuation in four different ways (Table 6).
14 We first
estimate whether individuals are willing to trade any dollars for perfect health, conditioning on
their current health. We find no difference in health valuation by smoking status. In the analysis
of amounts willing to pay for drug to cure cancer and Alzheimer’s disease, smoking status makes
no difference but persons’ subjective probability of getting these diseases has a positive and
significant effect on willingness to pay for a drug to cure these diseases.
Health valuations can be measured by two different approaches, revealed and stated
preference. Preferences are revealed by observing actual choices people make, given
tradeoffs between risks and compensation for those risks. Stated preferences are elicited
based on survey responses to hypothetical situations. A possible problem of the stated
preference approach is that respondents might act differently in an actual than in a
14 Since the variables bTrade any dollars for perfect health,Qb Willingness to pay for Alzheimer drug,Q and bWillingness
to pay for Cancer drugQ are discrete, we use probit and ordered probit regressions to estimate the specification in Eq. (1)




(1) OLS (2) First differences
Current smoker 0.007* (0.003)  0.011 (0.011)
Former smoker 0.005**
Subjective probability live to 75 0.000006 (0.00002)  0.012** (0.007)
Age  0.001* (0.000)
White  0.003 (0.003)
Female  0.018* (0.002)




Huber–White standard errors in brackets.
Coefficients for wave fixed effects are not shown.
* Significant at 1%.
** Significant at 10%.
A. Khwaja et al. / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 24 (2006) 667–682 678hypothetical situation (Freeman, 2003). But in revealed preference studies, there may be
measurement error in the risk variables, unobserved heterogeneity (e.g., omitted job and/or
individual characteristics), and choices about the risk and compensation for such risk may be
jointly determined.
Viscusi and Herch (2001) examined wage-risk tradeoffs for smokers and nonsmokers.
They used three-digit industry measures of job risk. However, there is likely to be within-
industry and within-firm variation in such risk, introducing a measurement error. Persons
who take risky jobs may engage in other risky behaviors leading to unobserved
heterogeneity. Correlations between health outcomes and current job may also reflect
exposure to risks in a past job. They estimate the wage premium for workplace risk
separately for smokers and nonsmokers and find that nonsmokers receive a much higher
premium for industry-wide injury risk than smokers. Smokers are penalized for prior injuries
while nonsmokers are not. They also find that smokers work in higher risk industries. This
implies that in equilibrium the wage offer curve is flatter for smokers than for nonsmokers.
There are two different explanations for their results: Smokers could have lower valuations
for good health. Viscusi and Herch (2001) estimated that the value of a lost workday injury
is from between $14,000 and $20,000 (1987 dollars) for smokers and between $31,000 and
$35,000 for nonsmokers. Another explanation is that smokers are more risk tolerant and
therefore require a lower risk premium. In sum, they were unable to distinguish between the
two potential explanations.
A contribution of our study is that we examine risk preferences and health valuations
separately, based on a stated preference approach to measuring health valuations. Using
several alternative dependent variables, we find no significant differences in health valuations
between smokers and never smokers. Our results suggest that the findings of Viscusi and
Table 6
Health valuation








(1) Probit (2) OLS (3) Ordered probit (4) Ordered probit
Current smoker 0.166 (0.173)  0.099 (0.277) 0.114 (0.156) 0.18 (0.174)
Former smoker 0.161 (0.147) 0.058 (0.231) 0.161 (0.136)  0.108 (0.141)
Subjective probability
live to 75
 0.007* (0.003) 0.001 (0.004) 0.003 (0.002) 0.003 (0.002)
Age  0.015 (0.011) 0.0002 (0.020) 0.017 (0.012) 0.003 (0.014)
White  0.476** (0.185) 0.74** (0.293)  0.009 (0.217)  0.106 (0.207)
Female  0.024 (0.141) 0.118 (0.217)  0.082 (0.127)  0.101 (0.135)








Observations 420 236 316 271
R-squared 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.02
Huber–White standard errors in brackets.
Coefficients for wave fixed effects are not shown.
* Significant at 1%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 10%.
A. Khwaja et al. / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 24 (2006) 667–682 679Herch (2001) may be explained not by lower health valuations of smokers, but by their
higher risk tolerance.
4. Conclusion
Smoking provides an interesting case study of preferences and subjective beliefs of risk
takers in an important, real-world context as well as offering implications for health and
safety regulation. Smokers are more impatient than nonsmokers, measured indirectly in
terms of their length of financial planning horizon. They are also more pessimistic about
future economic events, which may reinforce their present-orientation. Smokers are also
more risk tolerant. This suggests that smokers may more willingly bear risk and trade off
current utility against future costs of smoking, plausibly in part because they are more
pessimistic about the future. However, they do not value being in excellent health
differently from others. Our results also suggest that being more present-oriented and risk
tolerant is not caused by smoking; but represents innate characteristics. An implication of
our results for product regulation is that restricting access to cigarettes is likely to be
circumvented by smokers through other means. In particular, our results are consistent with
the finding that smokers in states with higher taxes smoke longer cigarettes that are also
higher in nicotine and tar content (Evans and Farrelly, 1998). In fact, as Breyer (1982,
p. 148) writes, bHow can the regulator predict public behavior if he restricts access to, say,
saccharin or peanut butter or even cigarettes? Will some, many, or all former consumers
turn to other riskier products? Might former smokers turn to alcohol or former saccharin
users eat more sweets?Q
In conclusion, our findings have important implications for health and safety regulation. If the
role of such regulation is to help people make better choices given their preferences and
subjective beliefs, the regulatory process should account for our finding that smokers have
relatively high discount rates and are more risk tolerant than are nonsmokers. More generally,
our results imply that health and safety regulations should be based on empirical verification of
assumptions about preferences and subjective beliefs that are typically made in the regulatory
process.
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Appendix A. HRS questions
A.1. Time preference
1) Financial planning horizon. In deciding how much of their family income to spend or save,
people are likely to think about different financial planning periods. In planning your (family’s)
saving and spending, which of the following time periods is most important to you (and your
husband/wife/partner), the next few months, the next year, the next few years, the next 5–10
years, or longer than 10 years?
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1) Probability of Economic Depression. What do you think are the chances that the U.S.
economy will experience a major depression sometime during the next 10 years or so? (0 is
absolutely no chance, 100 is absolutely certain)
2) Probability of Double-digit Inflation. What do you think are the chances that the U.S.
economy will experience double-digit inflation sometime during the next 10 years or so? (0 is
absolutely no chance, 100 is absolutely certain)
3) Probability of Social Security Cuts. How about the chances that Congress will change
Social Security sometime in the next 10 years or so, so that it becomes less generous than now?
(0 is absolutely no chance, 100 is absolutely certain)
4) Bioterrorism. What do you think is the percent chance that there will be a major incident of
bioterrorism in the United States in the next 5 years, directly affecting 100 people or more? (0 is
absolutely no chance, 100 is absolutely certain).
A.3. Risk tolerance
1) Relative risk tolerance. Suppose that you are the only income earner in the family. Your
doctor recommends that you move because of allergies, and you have to choose between two
possible jobs. The first would guarantee your current total family income for life. The second is
possibly better paying, but the income is also less certain. There is a 50–50 chance the second
job would double your total lifetime income and a 50–50 chance that it would cut it by a third.
Which job would you take—the first job or the second job?
This question was used from wave 4 onwards. It was phrased slightly different in wave 1.
Depending on the answer the question continues with questions that replace an income cut of a
third with an income cut of 20% or 50%.
A.4. Health valuation
1) Trade any money for perfect health. Imagine that you will live for exactly ten more
years in your current state of health. Assuming that your current medical expenses and
insurance premiums stay the same as they are now, would you be willing to pay any more
every month for additional medical treatment if it allowed you to live those ten years in
perfect health?
2) Amount of money willing to pay for perfect health. What is the greatest amount you would
be willing to pay each month to live in perfect health? Would you be willing to pay $50/ $200/
$500/$1000/ $2000/ $5000 per month?
3) Dollars per month willing to pay for Alzheimer drug. Suppose that a drug were discovered
that guaranteed that someone would never develop Alzheimer’s Disease, and that the treatment
was 100% effective as long as a person took one pill every month for the rest of their life.
Suppose further that there are no side effects. Would you be willing and able to pay $5/ $25/
$100/ $250/ $1000 per month for such a pill, or the same amount in higher insurance payments
to cover it?
4) Dollars per month willing to pay for Cancer drug. Suppose that the same sort of drug were
to be discovered that we talked about earlier. It would guarantee that someone would never
develop cancer, and it would be 100% effective as long as a person took one pill every month for
the rest of their life. This pill has no side effects. Would you be willing and able to pay 5/25/
A. Khwaja et al. / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 24 (2006) 667–682 681$100/ 250/1000 per month for a pill, or the same amount in higher insurance payments to cover
it, that would guarantee that you would not develop a fatal cancer?
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